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Abstract
This paper concerns how to generate and un-
derstand discourse anaphoric noun phrases. I
present the results of an analysis of all discourse
anaphoric noun phrases (N=1,233) in a corpus
of ten narrative monologues, where the choice
between a definite pronoun or phrasal NP con-
forms largely to Gricean constraints on infor-
mativeness. I discuss Dale & Reiter’s [Dale and
Reiter, To Appear] recent model and show how
it can be augmented for understanding as well
as generating the range of data presented here.
I argue that integrating centering [Grosz et al.,
1983] [Kameyama, 1985] with this model can be
applied uniformly to discourse anaphoric pro-
nouns and phrasal NPs. I conclude with a hy-
pothesis for addressing the interaction between
local and global discourse processing.
1 Introduction
This paper concerns how to generate and understand dis-
course anaphoric noun phrases, or noun phrases (NPs)
that evoke a discourse entity already in the discourse
model (Webber [1978]). Dale [1989] [1992] implements
Gricean constraints on informativeness for generating
discourse anaphoric NPs. However, his model fol-
lows the tradition of assuming that distinct constraints
govern pronouns versus phrasal NPs (cf. [Reichman,
1985] [Grosz and Sidner, 1986]). Centering [1983] [1985],
a model of local attentional state [1979], has been applied
primarily to definite pronouns. I argue that Gricean con-
straints should be applied equally to discourse anaphoric
pronouns and phrasal NPs, and that integrating center-
ing and informational constraints covers a broader range
of cases. In §2, I present an analysis of all discourse
anaphoric NPs (N=1,233) in a corpus of ten narratives
showing that semantic explicitness depends largely on
informational constraints. Discourse anaphoric NPs al-
most never provide new information, and are rarely more
∗The work reported here was not supported by Bellcore.
informative than necessary. In §3, I show how Dale &
Reiter’s [To Appear] generation model can be augmented
to apply uniformly to pronouns and phrasal NPs for both
generation and understanding. While centering has been
used to account for informationally under-specified pro-
nouns, I argue that centering also accounts for certain
over-specified phrasal NPs. In §4, I integrate centering
with the augmented Gricean model and discuss the ex-
tended coverage. Results in §2 include a one-way correla-
tion of overly informative discourse anaphoric NPs with
shifts in global discourse structure. In the conclusion, I
discuss directions for extending the integrated model in
ways that might indirectly account for this correlation.
2 Analysis of a Coded Corpus
In this section, I present the results of an analysis of all
discourse anaphoric NPs in a corpus of spoken narratives
directed at the question of how informative NPs are, rel-
ative to their contexts of occurrence. The first subsection
describes the corpus and coding features. The next sub-
section presents results showing that discourse anaphoric
NPs in the corpus, whether pronominal or phrasal, are
rarely more informative than necessary, and if so, tend
to occur at shifts in global discourse structure.
Fig. 1 identifies four possibilities regarding the se-
mantic informativeness of an NP relative to its context.
Three of them pertain to the following Gricean princi-
ples, referred to by Dale [1989] as informational ade-
quacy and efficiency: the speaker should be sufficiently
informative to unambiguously identify the intended ref-
erent (adequacy), and the speaker should be no more
informative than necessary (efficiency). The boxed pro-
nouns in (2a) of Fig. 1 are both adequate and efficient
(well-specified): it is clear what the pronouns refer to;
less informative forms (zero pronouns) would be ungram-
matical. The phrasal NPs in (2b) are adequate but not
efficient (over-specified). The pronominal NP in (2c) is
inadequate (under-specified; efficiency does not apply to
inadequate NPs): “it” could refer either to the ladder or
the tree. A fourth possibility is that an NP may per-
form two functions, to identify the referent and to add
information about it, as in (2d) (over-determined). In
1 A man1 saw a ladder2 leaning against a pear tree3.
2a. Later, he1 moved it2 to a different tree.
+adequate; +efficient well-specified
2b. The man1 moved the ladder3 to a different tree.
+adequate; −efficient; −increasing over-specified
2c. It (?) was tall.
−adequate under-specified
2d. The contented pear picker3 was done for the day.
+adequate; +increasing over-determined
Figure 1: Relative Informativeness
Fig. 1, the feature +/- increasing distinguishes between
over-determined and over-specified NPs.
2.1 Data Coding
The corpus consists of ten narrations from Chafe’s Pear
stories [1980]. Chafe recorded and transcribed subjects
who had been asked to view the same movie and describe
it to a second person. The movie contained seven sequen-
tial episodes about a man picking pears. It had a vivid
sound track, but no language. As part of a long term
study of the relationship between linguistic features and
discourse structure [Passonneau and Litman, 1993] [Lit-
man and Passonneau, 1995b] [Litman and Passonneau,
1995a], discourse anaphoric NPs in the corpus had al-
ready been coded for coreference relations and location.
Location of an NP is represented here in terms of the
containing sentential utterance and discourse segment,
as described below. Fig. 2 illustrates an excerpt.
Si Uj
6 28 And you think ”Wow, this little boy’si
probably going to come and see the pears,
29 [ps] and [ps] hei ’s going to take a pear or two,
and then.. go on his way.”
7 30 [ps] U-m but the little boyi comes,
31 [ps] a-nd u-h [1.0]] hei doesn’t want just a pear,
32 hei wants a whole basket.
8 33 [ps] So hei puts the- [ps] bicycle down,
34 and hei [ps] you wonder
how he’si going to take it with this.
Figure 2: Narrative Excerpt Illustrating Informative-
ness
Chafe [1980] identified three types of prosodic phrases
from graphic displays of intonation contours. A period
indicates a phrase terminated by a pitch fall, a question
mark indicates final level or rising pitch, and a comma
indicates phrase final—not sentence-final—intonation.
The transcriptions here show all repeated and incom-
plete words and phrases, non-lexical articulations such
as “uh, um, tsk”, and vowel lengthening as indicated by
‘-’. Pause locations are shown as ‘[ps]’.
Sentential utterances are defined be a non-overlapping
sequence of units that completely covers the discourse.
Briefly, a new sentential utterance begins with a func-
tionally independent clause (FIC) if it is immediately
adjacent to the preceding FIC. Otherwise it begins at the
onset of the prosodic phrase where the next FIC begins.
An FIC is a tensed clause that is not a verb argument,
a restrictive relative clause, or one of a set of formulaic
“interjection” clauses (e.g., “You know” with no clausal
argument; for full details cf. [Passonneau, 1994a]). Mate-
rial between clauses includes sentence or word fragments,
and non-lexical articulations (e.g., “um”). Locations and
sequence numbers of the seven sentential utterances in
Fig. 2 are shown in column 2.
The global context is structured into sequential seg-
ments, multi-utterance units whose utterances are pre-
sumed to be more related to one another semantically
and pragmatically than to other utterances. The seg-
ments numbered 6-8 (col. 1 of Fig. 2) were derived from
an empirical study described in [Passonneau and Lit-
man, 1993]. Each narrative was segmented by 7 new,
untrained subjects. Subjects were instructed to place
segment boundaries in transcripts whenever the narra-
tor had finished one communicative task and begun a
new one. They were restricted to placing boundaries be-
tween prosodic phrases. To focus their attention on the
criterion, subjects’ were also instructed to label segments
with a brief description of the speaker’s intention.
The size and number of segments per subject per
narrative varied widely, from a rate of 5.5% to 41.3%
(Avg.=16%), with segment widths ranging from 1 to 49
phrases (Avg.=5.9). Despite this variation, the num-
ber of times 4 to 7 subjects assigned boundaries in the
same place was extremely significant (using Cochran’s
Q [1950]; cf. [Passonneau and Litman, 1993]). We took
agreement among at least 4 subjects as the threshold for
empirically validated boundaries.
A surface constituent is considered to be a discourse
anaphoric NP if it occurs in free variation with syntacti-
cally prototypical NPs, and corefers with a preceding NP
(cf. [Passonneau, 1994a]). One type of empty category
is also included, namely zero pronoun subjects of FICs
conjoined by “,”, “and”, etc. In Fig. 2, the sequence of
coreferential NPs used to refer to the little boy are coin-
dexed. Segments 7 and 8 in Fig. 2 both begin with an
utterance containing an NP referring to the boy. At the
onset of segment 7, a phrasal NP is used to refer to him
(U30) whereas at the onset of segment 8 (U33), a definite
pronoun is used. But a pronoun could have replaced the
phrasal NP in U30 with no loss of information. So the
phrasal NP is over-specified but not over-determined; the
attributes “boy” and “little” were already mentioned in
U28. The pronoun subject in U33 is locally well-specified
because the boy is the only animate entity mentioned in
U32; it is globally well-specified because the boy is the
only entity in the discourse with a bicycle.
2.2 Analysis of Informational Constraints
The goal of the analysis is to determine whether rela-
tive informativeness of NPs correlates with global dis-
course structure (cf. [Reichman, 1985] [Grosz and Sid-
ner, 1986]). Any phrasal NP that is discourse anaphoric
Uj
84 [ps] You just know that those little boys are going to go back,
[ps] to where the pear tree was,
85 and you just know that old man ’s going to see [ps] these little
boys coming and say ”Ha.. you’re the ones who stole the pears.”
Figure 3: Over-determined NP
is potentially over-specified, whereas a definite pro-
noun will only be over-specified if a zero pronoun could
have been used. I first sorted the discourse anaphoric
NPs in the corpus (N=1,233) into the three categories
of phrasal NPs (PhrNPs; N=563), explicit pronouns
(PROs: definite, indefinite, demonstrative; N=544),
and zero pronominals (ZPs; N=126). Then I identi-
fied all pairs of coindexed NPs where NP2 was more ex-
plicit than NP1. This procedure identified 128 discourse
anaphoric NPs in the corpus that were potentially over-
specified or over-determined. The sole over-determined
NP, illustrated in Fig. 3, occurs relatively late in the
narrative (U85); it seems mainly to provide contrast (cf.
“that old man” vs. those little boys”).
Potentially over-specified NPs were sorted into four
mutually exclusive categories—well-specified, segment
onset, attentional shift, and reiterative. A potentially
over-specified NP is well-specified if a less explicit form
would have been ambiguous or unclear. The containing
utterance is included in the context since the proposition
expressed in an utterance can disambiguate a referring
expression. A potentially over-specified NP that is not
well-specified, but which occurs in the first utterance of
a new segment, is classified as a segment onset. The seg-
ments in the coded Pear corpus arguably contain intra-
segmental shifts of attention associated with changes in
temporal aspect, or shifts in discourse reference time (for
definitions assumed here, cf. [Kameyama et al., 1993]).
The third category, attentional shift, consists of these
cases. A fourth catch-all category includes, e.g., repeti-
tions, repairs, contrastive NPs and unexplained cases.
Table 1 indicates that most potentially over-specified
NPs (N=127) were either well-specified (46%) or occur
at an empirically verified segment onset (16%) or a hy-
pothesized attentional shift (23%). Of the 69 NPs whose
nearest antecedent was in a distinct segment, 29% oc-
curred at a segment onset. Over a third (36%) of the
NPs whose antecedent was in the same segment, and
12% of those whose antecedent was in a distinct segment
Antecedent Well- Segment Atten. Other Total
Segment Specified Onset Shift
Same 22 - 21 15 58
% 38% - 36% 26% 100%
Prev 37 20 10 4 69
% 53% 29% 12% 6% 100%
Totals 59 20 29 19 127
% 46% 16% 23% 15% 100%
Table 1: Potentially Over-Specified NPs
occurred at an intra-segmental attentional shift. In sum,
in the coded Pear corpus, NPs that re-evoke existing en-
tities seem to be rarely over-specified (68/1233, or 5.5%)
or over-determined (1/1233). Of the 68 over-specified
cases (columns 2-5), 20 (30%) correlate with segment
onsets independently identified by naive subjects, and
29 (42%) appear to correlate with intra-segmental atten-
tional shifts. Thus, an over-specified NP is more likely
than not to correlate with an attentional shift (72%).
Note however, that the reverse implication does not hold,
that is, it is not the case that a segment shift is likely to
be signalled by an over-specified NP.
2.3 Focused Attribute Sets
To account for the choice of modifiers in phrasal dis-
course anaphoric NPs, it is necessary to determine
how attributes are selected from the information known
about a discourse entity. According to Grice’s [1975]
maxim of quality, speakers should be relevant. With
respect to discourse anaphoric NPs in the Pear stories,
NP modifiers are derived from what I refer to as focussed
attribute sets, independent of whether the NP is over-
specified. Focussed attribute sets comprise the following
three categories of relevance. First, an attribute set can
be in focus because it was mentioned in the most recent
phrasal NP. For example, in Fig. 2, the boy is referred to
in U30 as “the little boy,” repeating attributes mentioned
in the last phrasal NP referring to the boy (in U28).
Second, the focussed attribute set may specify the
most recently mentioned location of an entity. The sub-
ject NP in U17 of Fig. 5 (§3.2) refers to one man as “the
man up in the tree” to distinguish him from the second
man who came by with a goat. The tree is the last mutu-
ally known location of the former. Finally, an attribute
set can be in focus because it pertains to a key narrative
event that the entity has been an agent of. Intuitively,
an event is more central to a narrative the more diffi-
cult it is to describe the narrative without mentioning
that event. Operationally, key events occur more fre-
quently than others both within and across narratives.
For example, the main adult character is often described
as “the pear picker,” or as “the man who was picking
pears” (see U108 of Fig. 6, §4), and so on; the other main
character is often described as “the thief,” “the boy who
stole the pears,” “the boy with the pears,” and so on.
How to order the focussed attribute sets for a given
discourse entity is a topic for further investigation. Here,
I simply assume that the three types of attribute sets
mentioned above—where applicable—are in focus. I
also assume that the focussed attribute sets of an en-
tity (FAVe) are updated as the discourse progresses.
3 Modelling Informativeness of NPs
The data reported above indicates that in the Pear cor-
pus, definite pronouns and phrasal NPs are rarely over-
specified or over-determined. In this section, I describe a
processing model to account for this observation. In the
next section, I discuss how centering can be integrated
with this model to account for under-specified pronouns,
and certain over-specified phrasal NPs. First, I briefly
review Dale’s [1989] [1992] model, including his more re-
cent work with Reiter [To Appear]. Then I modify this
model to apply to understanding as well as generation;
to include the current utterance in the context of eval-
uation; to apply informational constraints uniformly to
pronouns and phrasal NPs; and to select modifiers on
the basis of focused attribute-value pairs.
3.1 Distinguishing Descriptions
Dale [1989] generates anaphoric pronouns and phrasal
NPs by distinct means. In EPICURE [1989], a system
for generating recipes, a definite pronoun is always gen-
erated to refer to the ‘discourse center’, which is anal-
ogous to the backward-looking center of [Grosz et al.,
1983] [Kameyama, 1985], but is domain specific. It is
the entity that results from the next recipe operation.
For example, rice1 will be the center after an utterance
of Stir the rice1.
Dale [1989] requires phrasal NPs to be distinguishing
descriptions. As in Webber [1978], Dale assumes that
the discourse model represents the discourse entities that
have already been evoked, and the attribute-value pairs
describing them. For any set of entities U, Dale [1989]
defines a distinguishing description of an entity e in U to
be a set of attribute-value pairs that are true of e, and
of no other members of U. This enforces adequacy. He
defines a minimal distinguishing description to be one
where the cardinality of the attribute-value pairs cannot
be reduced. This addresses efficiency.1
Dale [1989] defines the discriminatory power (F) of an
attribute-value pair <A, V> that is true of a discourse
entity e in a universe of entities U in terms of the cardi-
nality N of U, and the total number n of entities in U
that <A, V> is true of:
F(< A, V >, U) = N − n
N − 1
F ranges in value from 0 to 1. If < A, V > is true of only
one of the entities in the set U, then F<A, V > is 1, and
< A, V > is a distinguishing description of the entity.
Dale’s [1989] algorithm for constructing a distinguish-
ing description of e in U, given a set P of attribute-value
pairs that are true of e, briefly works as follows. First
compute F for each member of P . If all values of F are
0, no unique description can be constructed. Otherwise,
select the attribute-value pair with the highest value to
add to the description, and reset U to be only those en-
tities in the initial U that the selected attribute-value
pair is true of. Repeat this process, terminating when
an attribute-value pair with a discriminatory power of
1Cf. Reiter [1990] for a discussion of problems in gener-
ating maximally efficient NPs using Dale’s framework, and
Dale & Reiter [To Appear] for an argument that maximal
efficiency is psychologically implausible.
1 has been selected. The selected attribute-value pairs
constitute the input description for a surface NP.
In recent work, Dale & Reiter [To Appear] enforce a
range of Gricean constraints using an algorithm based
on human behavior that is simpler and faster than their
previous algorithms [Dale, 1989] [Reiter, 1990]. It per-
forms less length-oriented optimization, thus balancing
brevity against lexical preference. The output NPs are
not guaranteed to be maximally short because humans
occasionally use unnecessary modifiers. The 5.5% rate of
over-specified discourse anaphoric NPs in the Pear data
also supports the relaxation of brevity, but is partly con-
ditioned by attentional factors (cf.§§4-5).
3.2 C describe
In this section I illustrate the role of c describe in pro-
cessing definite pronouns and phrasal NPs. C describe
is a 4-place relation among a discourse entity E, a sur-
face NP, the current utterance context λU , and the dis-
course context C that requires λNPλU to be a distin-
guishing description of E relative to C. For generation,
NP is solved for given an instantiation of the remaining
three arguments, whereas E is solved for during under-
standing (assuming Prolog’s control structure).
A definite pronoun that is a distinguishing description
is also a minimal distinguishing description because its
length is 1. In generation, C describe attempts first to
find a definite pronoun to satisfy the uninstantiated NP
argument, succeeding if the pronoun is a distinguishing
description. For generating the pronoun “he” in U4 of
Fig. 4, the arguments of c describe are:
c describe(e1, NP,(1)
λX fills′(X, “his thing′′, “pears′′), FS1)
The utterance context is assumed to be a feature struc-
ture co-indexed with any relevant discourse entities other
than the uninstantiated variable E.2 By using the utter-
ance as part of the input in solving for NP, given infor-
mation that appears anywhere in the current utterance
can filter entities from the discourse context, following
Dale’s [1989] algorithm. New information about an en-
tity in the utterance is not mutually known, and has no
discriminatory power [Dale, 1989].
For present purposes, the last argument of c describe
is first instantiated to the most recent focus space, and
in turn to other focus spaces until a solution is found.
Dale [1989] takes the universe of discourse to be parti-
tioned into focus spaces (cf. [Grosz and Sidner, 1986]),
with the most recent focus space being the most acces-
sible, and making no assumptions regarding relative ac-
cessibility of earlier focus spaces. Similar assumptions
are made here. I assume that segment boundaries in the
Pear corpus correspond to focus spaces, and that some
2For simplicity, the utterance context represents certain
semantic arguments as quoted strings.
Si Uj
2 4 [ps] A- nd he (e1) [ps] fills his- thing with pears,
5 and ZERO (e1) comes down
6 and there’s a basket he (e1) puts them in.
3 7 [ps] A-nd you see- [ps] passerbyers on
bicycles and stuff go by.
8 [ps] A-nd [ps] then a boy (e2) comes by,
[ps] on a bicycle,
9 the man (e1) is in the tree,
10 [ps] and the boy (e2) gets off the bicycle,
11 and ZERO (e2) looks at the man (e1) ,
Figure 4: Excerpt from Narrative 9
focus spaces may be composed of others. I assume the
existence of an inference mechanism that constrains how
focus spaces are signalled during generation, and how fo-
cus spaces are inferred during understanding. In recent
work, for example, Litman and I report on algorithmic
methods for identifying segment boundaries in the Pear
corpus using features of prosody, cue words and referen-
tial NPs [Litman and Passonneau, 1995a]. Given such a
mechanism, a new focus space would be added to the dis-
course model after a segment onset has been processed.
In (1), FS1 appears as the initial context argument of
c describe. The only animate entity in FS1 is e1, pre-
viously described as a man picking pears in a pear tree
who looks like a farmer, is plump, has a mustache, and is
wearing a white apron (utterances 1-3, not shown here).
The feature structures corresponding to all but one of
the definite pronouns “he, she, it” or “they” will be re-
jected as a description of e1 because e1 is neither plural,
non-animate or female.3 The pronoun “he”, represented
as the attribute-value pairs (<type: human>, <gender:
male>, <cardinality: 1>), not only describes e1, it is
also a minimal distinguishing description.
An analogous process applies to understanding the
same pronoun in U4, with the entity variable E unin-
stantiated, NP instantiated to “he”, and the utterance
and discourse context instantiated as above. Given a dis-
tinguishing description, there is guaranteed to be exactly
one solution to E. However, the search problem increases
with the size of the context. Partitioning the search
space into focus spaces controls the search through the
discourse model to some degree. (Integrating centering
with c describe as described below guides the search even
further.) For present purposes, c describe returns E in-
stantiated to e1 after searching through the entities in
FS1. The remaining NPs exemplified here are under-
stood in a similar fashion.
Given a context where there is no definite pronoun
solution to NP, c describe will attempt to construct a
phrasal NP, preferably with no modifiers. In Fig. 4, a
new, singular, male, human entity is added to the con-
text at U8: a boy who comes by on a bicycle (e2). Subse-
quent references to the boy or the man must discriminate
3For simplicity, I am ignoring the difference between gram-
matical gender and sex.
Si Uj
13 and it’s just a monotonous kind of thing for him (e1).
4 14 [ps] And a man (e2) comes along with a goat,
15 [ps] and the goat obviously is interested in the pears.
16 But the man (e2) just walks by with the goat.
5 17 And the man (e1) up in the tree
doesn’t even notice.
Figure 5: Phrasal NP to Avoid Ambiguity
between them. The utterance context for the subject NP
of U9—λ X in
′(X, “the tree′′)—does not identify e1 be-
cause U5—“he comes down”—leads to the inference that
the man is no longer in the tree. However, e1 is a male
adult and e1 is a male child, a distinction encoded by
the common nouns “man” versus “boy”. Since “man”
is what Dale & Reiter [To Appear] refer to as a basic
attribute, “man” will be selected as the head noun. The
determiner will be definite because the entity is already
in the context (but cf. [Passonneau, 1994b]). The result-
ing NP the man is a minimal distinguishing description
because no pronoun is a distinguishing description.
Fig. 5 illustrates a context where a phrasal NP without
modifiers could not both have a head noun that specifies
a basic attribute, and be a distinguishing description. It
also illustrates the problematic nature of relations among
distinct focus spaces. In generating the subject NP in
U17, the last argument of c describe is first instantiated
to FS4. The pears referred to in U15 of segment 4 are
some pears that e1 picked, so in order to interpret U15,
e1 must be brought into focus. This side-effect of re-
solving the reference to the pears could be implemented
by adding e1 to FS4, or by resetting the current focus
space to a more encompassing focus structure that in-
cludes FS3 and FS4. I believe further empirical work is
needed to resolve such issues. In any case, I assume that
the context for generating U17 includes both e1 and e2.
Because these two entities are the same type, a distin-
guishing description of e1 must contain discriminatory
modifiers. Features for generating the modifiers are se-
lected from FAVe1 , which here contains only two sets of
salient attributes. Since e1’s location is the most recently
evoked, it is used in generating the NP.
Above, I noted that centering can add structure to the
search space for understanding discourse anaphoric NPs.
Fig. 4 illustrates another reason to integrate centering
with c describe. In U10 of Fig. 4, the subject NP (“the
boy”) is not a pronoun even though the utterance context
is a distinguishing description of e2. The boy (e2) is mu-
tually known to have been on a bicycle at the time of the
event mentioned in utterance U8. Temporal processing
(cf. [Kameyama et al., 1993]) would lead to the infer-
ence that the boy is still on the bicycle after U9. Thus
a definite pronoun is presumably well-specified, and the
model presented so far would generate “he”. However,
a pronoun would produce a garden path effect in this
context; i.e., it would be interpreted as referring to the
man until “bicycle” has been processed.
4 Centering and Informativeness
The c describe relation has three limitations that center-
ing can compensate for. First, c describe constrains the
semantic content of a discourse anaphoric NP, but not
its grammatical role. Second, as noted below, centering
predicts that a pronoun can be under-specified. Third,
an explanation is needed for the over-specified NP the
boy in U10 of Fig. 2. In this section, I indicate how cen-
tering is interleaved with c describe. Centering is a more
local process so it applies first.
4.1 Centering
Centering is a model of local focus of attention that
constrains the use of definite pronouns [Grosz et al.,
1983] [Kameyama, 1985]. One of the discourse enti-
ties [Webber, 1978] evoked by an NP in an utterance
Ui may be the backward-looking center (CB) [Grosz et
al., 1983] of Ui, the current local focus of attention. Al-
ternatively, the CB of Ui (CBUi) might not be explic-
itly mentioned (realized) in the utterance [Grosz et al.,
1983]. The discourse entities mentioned in Ui comprise
the forward looking centers (CFs), ordered by increasing
obliqueness of grammatical role [Kameyama, 1985] [Pas-
sonneau, 1989] to represent the likelihood that they will
be mentioned in the subsequent utterance. The center-
ing principle [Grosz et al., 1983] predicts that if CBUi
and CBUi−1 are the same entity, then the NP evoking
CBUi will be a third person, definite pronoun.
(2) a. Carmellaj went to the bookstore.
b. Afterwards, shej gave Rachelk a new book.
c. Shej ’s a true bibliophile.
Example (2) illustrates that where the semantics of the
utterance and commonsense reasoning do not discrimi-
nate among possible referents for an ambiguous pronoun,
there is an independent effect of local attentional con-
straints. Centering predicts that the preferred interpre-
tation of the pronoun in (2c) is Carmella. But in this
context, neither the pronoun alone nor the utterance is
a distinguishing description of anyone, so the pronoun is
under-specified.
(3) a. Carmellaj went to the bookstore.
b. On her way home, shej saw Rachelk.
c. Shek looked pale.
Kameyama [1985] used examples like (3) to illustrate
how commonsense reasoning and lexical semantics can
override the default centering predictions for pronoun
interpretation. Centering would predict that ‘Carmella’
is the backward-looking center of (3b), and that the de-
fault interpretation of the pronoun in (3c) would thus
be ‘Carmella’. Instead, (3c) is interpreted as a continu-
ation of the description of the perceptual event in (3b).
Kameyama [1986] posits property sharing of features of
adjacent utterances as a constraint on CB, where the
shared property can be subject (or non-subject) gram-
matical role (cf. [Passonneau, 1989]), as in (2), or what
she refers to as empathy, as in (3). Note that because
‘Rachel’ is already known to be the object of the per-
ceptual event in (3b), the utterance context in (3c) is a
distinguishing description of ‘Rachel.’
4.2 Integrated Model
Fig. 6 shows all of one segment and part of another
one where the subject pronouns of all the utterances
are coreferential. On the one hand, the CB of the seg-
ment initial utterance U108 is the same as the CB of
U107, conflicting with the idea expressed in [Grosz et al.,
1986] that centering transitions reflect global discourse
coherence (cf. [Passonneau, To appear]). On the other
hand, integrating centering and c describe can account
for both NPs in U108 and support inferences consistent
with a global focus shift.
Earlier in the narrative excerpted in Fig. 6, three boys
helped the pear thief after he had fallen off of his bicy-
cle, and were rewarded with three pears. Segment 21
describes their adventures after the pear thief leaves. In
generating utterance U108, the input to the generator
will be a representation of an event in which the boys
eat their pears. The set of three boys is designated as
the new CB. Because CBU108 is the same as CBU107 ,
it should be realized as a pronoun [Grosz et al., 1983],
and by property sharing [Kameyama, 1985] [Passonneau,
1989], it should be realized as the subject of the current
utterance. Centering and Gricean constraints coincide
here in that the definite pronoun “they” is also a mini-
mal distinguishing description.
To generate the phrasal NP object in U108, the process
is analogous to that discussed above for generating “the
man up in the tree” in Fig. 5. The context argument of
c describe is first set to CfU107 . Since neither CfU107 nor
the most accessible focus space (FS21) contains a repre-
sentation of e2, the context argument will be reset until
e2 is in a focus space on the focus stack. Focussed at-
tribute sets are then used to generate the relative clause.
For understanding the subject NP in U108, recall that
centering applies before c describe. The subject pronoun
will be assumed to realize the CB of the utterance, and
will be assigned the default interpretation of e1. Applica-
tion of c describe leads to the recognition that “they” is
also a distinguishing description of e1 relative to CFU107 .
In this fashion, centering prunes the search space to the
single entity satisfying the informational constraints im-
Si Uj
21 105 [ps] So they (e1)’re walking along,
106 and they (e1) brush off their pears (e3),
107 and they (e1) start eating it (e3).
22 108 Then they (e1) walk by-[ps]
the man who was picking the pears (e2)
Figure 6: Excerpt from Narrative 1
posed by c describe. In understanding the object NP,
the context argument must be instantiated to a more in-
clusive focus space, since neither the previous utterance
nor the previous segment contains any entities described
by this NP.
The integrated model also accounts for the problem-
atic phrasal NP in Fig. 4, discussed above. We saw that
for U9 and U10, repeated below, the phrasal subject of
U9 was well-specified, but the phrasal subject of U10
was over-specified, and a pronoun would be generated
instead. But as noted above, a pronoun subject would
have a garden path effect.
U9: the man (e1) is in the tree (e3),
U10: and the boy (e2) gets off the bicycle (e4),
Kameyama’s version of centering [1986] differs
from [Grosz et al., 1983] in allowing an utterance to have
a null CB. U10 would have a null CB because there is no
definite pronoun constrained by property sharing that
corefers with an NP in the previous utterance; in fact no
NPs in U10 refer to entities mentioned in U9. A definite
pronoun subject in U10 would be assumed to be CBU10
and would be inferred to refer to e1. This accounts for
the garden path effect. Consequently, a pronoun must
be blocked. Because no entity in U9 is referred to in U10,
the input for generating U10 will be annotated as having
a NULL CB. This imposes output constraints requiring
the subject and object NPs to be other than definite
pronouns. As a consequence, c describe will not try to
find a pronoun solution to the uninstantiated NP argu-
ment. In the first phrasal NP solution, the head would
denote a basic category and the NP would have no mod-
ifiers, thus generating the existing phrase “the boy”. In
sum, centering relaxes the constraint otherwise imposed
by c describe that an NP cannot be over-specified.
5 Conclusion
I have presented an analysis of discourse anaphoric
phrasal NPs in a corpus of narrative monologues showing
that pronouns and phrasal NPs are rarely over-specified.
Future research should indicate to what degree this
generalization applies to other genres and modalities.
Centering predicts conditions under which an under-
specified pronoun can be used, but says little about the
interpretation of phrasal NPs. I have outlined a process-
ing model that integrates the attentional constraints of
centering with aspects of Grice’s maxims of quantity and
quality. For enforcing the maxim of quantity, I rely on
Dale’s algorithm for constructing distinguishing descrip-
tions [1989] [1992], which I apply uniformly to pronouns
and phrasal NPs for both generation and understanding.
For enforcing the maxim of quality, I combine aspects of
Dale & Reiter’s [To Appear] preferred attributes with
the construct of focussed attribute sets derived from the
corpus analysis. In contrast to Dale & Reiter [To Ap-
pear], distinguishing descriptions are evaluated using the
current utterance context as a filter, and by instantiat-
ing the discourse context successively to the Cf list of the
preceding utterance, then the current focus space, then
other focus spaces, until a solution is found.
Centering provides one mechanism for relaxing the re-
quirement that an NP (either pronominal or phrasal)
should be a distinguishing description. Another mecha-
nism would be needed to relax informational constraints
at shifts in focus structure, so as to account for the one-
way implication of over-specified NPs with global shifts
of attention (Table 1). However, further investigation is
needed to determine how to integrate local and global
discourse processing. When neither the Cf list nor the
current focus space is the appropriate context for under-
standing or generating a discourse anaphoric NP, I have
assumed that either an earlier focus space or a more
inclusive one must be accessed. Some of the examples
presented here suggest that the contextual dependencies
captured by the use of focused attributes might constrain
the relation of each new utterance to the global discourse
model. For example, the segment onset in Fig. 6 (U108)
contains two NPs, one of which is the same as the CB of
the preceding utterance. Maintaining the same CB re-
lates U108 and its focus space (FS22) to the most recent
focus space FS21. But the object NP expresses attributes
last mentioned in segment 17, thus relating U108 to the
earlier focus space FS17. If the global structure is a tree,
the relation of U107 to both segments 21 and 17 might
indicate how high up in the tree to locate the new focus
space. Alternatively, an investigation of such relations
might provide evidence about the nature of global struc-
ture, such as whether it is a tree or a lattice.
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